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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
doer had no right to be credited with the payments made by the employer
under such circumstances, saying: "Anything earned prior to the injuries
certainly cannot be related by any sound reasoning process to the loss of
wages or salary during the period of incapacity following the injuries."'2
It should be kept in mind that the court was not considering the case in
which an employer without legal or contractual obligation, but gratu-
tously, continues the wage or salary payment.
EDGAR I. KING
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
1956 was a banner year for the student of family law. There were
sixty-five reported cases in the area, of which twenty-five are worth noting.
Interstate Divorce
The concept of "divisible divorce" was established by the Estin' and
Krezger2 cases, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a
Nevada ex parte divorce was ineffectual to cancel a prior New York ali-
mony decree, although the divorce did terminate the marital status. It
has been argued that New York would be bound to give full faith and
credit to the denial of alimony in Nevada, (1) if Nevada were the state
of matrimonial domicile,3 or (2) if the wife did not already have a valid
New York alimony decree. Both of these issues were presented to the
Supreme Court last year in Armstrong v. Armstrong,4 a case coming up
for review from Ohio.
In the Armstrong case, the husband obtained a divorce in Florida,
which was the state of matrimonial domicile. Mrs. Armstrong did not
appear. The Florida court determined that it had personal jurisdiction
over her because she was domiciled in Florida, heard the evidence on
need for alimony, and decreed that no award of alimony be made to her.
Subsequently, Mrs. Armstrong sued her husband in Ohio for divorce
and alimony. The Ohio court held that: (1) the wife could not get a
divorce in Ohio, as Ohio must give full faith and credit to the Florida
decree terminating the marriage; (2) the finding of the Florida court as
to the domicile of the wife was incorrect and was subject to collateral
attack in Ohio; (3) the in personam right of the wife to alimony was
not cut off by the Florida decree, and could be asserted for the first time
in an alimony action subsequent to the divorce (unlike Kretger and Estm,
where the alimony decree preceded the divorce), and (4) the fact that
'I d. at 112, 131 N.E.2d at 417.
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Florida was the state of matrimonial domicile did not give Florida in
personam jurisdiction over the parties to the marriage.
The majority in the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ohio
decree on the ground that the Florida court had neither denied nor
granted alimony, and therefore no question of full faith and credit was
involved. There are limits beyond which a court should not go in an
attempt to avoid a constitutional issue, and in my opinion the court dearly
exceeded these limits. Four members of the Court, in a concurring opin-
ion, refused to duck the issues and upheld the Ohio decision on all points,
in spite of early cases which held that the state of matrimonial domicile
had personal jurisdiction over both spouses.
What is the result of this litigation? On the two constitutional is-
sues of effect of matrimonial domicile and the power of Ohio to grant
alimony in spite of the lack of a prior alimony decree, we have the unam-
mous opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court and the opinion of four judges
of the United States Supreme Court upholding the right of an ex-wife
to sue for alimony. In spite of the lack of a dear cut decision by the
majority of the Court, it seems reasonably certain that the concept of
matrimonial domicile is no longer valid. The principal importance of
the case to the Ohio lawyer lies in the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court, which held as a matter of substantive law that in an alimony only
action, the plaintiff and defendant need not be husband and wife at the
time the action is begun. It is enough if the plaintiff is an ex-spouse
whose right of support has not yet been determined in a binding pro-
ceeding. This decision is contrary to the substantive law of two states
(New York and Pennsylvania) which have passed on the issue, and
have denied the ex-wife alimony, not because the foreign ex parte decree
denying alimony is entitled to full faith and credit, but because that part
of the foreign decree which terminates the marriage is so entitled, and as




It is generally held in Ohio, as elsewhere, that a divorce action may
1 Estin v. Estn, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
'Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948)
'Two cases, decided before the Estin and Kreiger cases, held that the state of matri-
momal domicile had in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in a divorce case,
even though she did not appear, and that a decree denying alimony was entitled to
full faith and credit. Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913); Atherton v.
Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
'350 U.S. 568 (1956), affirming, 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1955), af-
firming, 99 Ohio App. 7, 130 N.E.2d 710 (1954)
'Three cases involving procedure in divorce actions are discussed in detail in the
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be maintained against a mentally incompetent defendant. In Shenk v.
Shenk6 a court of appeals was faced with the question of the capacity of
an insane person to bring an action as plaintiff. The court held that the
decision to seek a divorce was personal, and therefore the guardian of an
insane ward could not sue for divorce.
The common practice of pleading a ground for divorce in the bare
language of the statute, without any supporting facts, has been the subject
of dispute in the courts of appeals. This controversy was settled in
Dansby v. Dansby,7 in which the Supreme Court held that such a pleading
was not subject to demurrer, but was subject to a motion to make definite
and certain. The court pointed out that good pleading requires sufficient
allegations of fact, and a trial court which refuses to grant a motion to
make certain has abused its discretion.8
In Lampe v. Lampe,9 a case of first impression in Ohio, a common
pleas court held that the defendant in an annulment action can cross-
petition for a divorce, even though he is a nonresident of Ohio. The one
year residence requirement is not a prerequisite to an annulment action,
and under the rationale of this case, a plaintiff could establish residence
in Ohio today, sue for annulment tomorrow, and the nonresident defend-
ant could cross-petition for a divorce, thus completely avoiding the one
year residence statute. The court was careful to point out that the de-
cision did not go this far, because in this case the plaintiff had been an
Ohio resident for a year.
2. Alimony - Power of Court to Grant
In Beach v. Beach'0 the trial court in a divorce action made an award
CIVIL PROCEDURE section, supra. These are: Plater v. Jefferson, 136 N.E.2d 111
(Ohio App. 1956) (collateral attack on divorce judgment); Perry v. Perry, 100
Ohio App. 15, 135 N.E.2d 427 (1955) (trial judge must hear entire divorce case);
Poe v. Poe, 99 Ohio App. 542, 135 N.E.2d 484 (1954) (condonation is an af-
firmatve defense which cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss).
6 135 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio App. 1954)
'165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358 (1956) This case is also discussed in the
CIVIL PROCEDURE section, supra.
'Both the code and good practice require the pleading of facts and not law. Of
course, in every case, a pleader should avoid pleading facts he cannot prove. This
rule is especially important in divorce cases. In the average non-divorce case, neither
the attorney nor the party is liable for a defamatory pleading, as judicial proceedings
are privileged. However, the privilege does not apply where the untrue allegation is
used, not as the basis for a tort action, but as the basis for a divorce or alimony action.
Libel and slander are not grounds for divorce, but they have been held to con-
stitute "'extreme cruelty." In the Armstrong case, the ground for the Ohio alimony
action was that the husband was guilty of cruelty in that he made allegations about
his wife, which he knew to be untrue, in the Florida divorce action, both in the
pleadings and in testimony.
136 N.E. 2d 470 (Ohio C.P 1954)
10 134 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio App. 1955)
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of temporary alimony to the wife by requiring the husband to pay the
wife's attorney's fee directly to her attorney. The husband refused to
comply and was convicted of civil contempt. The husband appealed and
the wife filed a motion with the court of appeals asking for temporary
alimony pending the appeal. The statute provides that in a divorce or
alimony action, the trial court may grant temporary alimony, and on ap-
peal, the court of appeals may grant like alimony pending appeal.'1
Literally construed, the statute appears to authorize alimony by the ap-
pellate court only in a direct appeal of the alimony or divorce decree,
and not in an appeal of a contempt case. However, the court held that a
contempt proceeding grows out of the divorce action and is sufficiently
related to the divorce decree so as to fall within the appeal statute. How-
ever, the court held that the provision in the appeal statute authorizing
the court of appeals to fix temporary alimony was unconstitutional. The
Ohio Constitution gives the court of appeals original jurisdiction in cer-
tain specified cases and appellate jurisdiction in other cases. 12 The court
held that a grant of temporary alimony is an exercise of original jurisdic-
ton, as issues of fact are involved. Since the grant of alimony is neither
an appellate proceeding nor one of the specified types of original juris-
dicuon, the statute is an invalid attempt to confer jurisdiction on an ap-
pellate court beyond the constitutional grant of jurisdiction, which has
been held to be exclusive. The court concluded by denying any inherent
non-statutory power in an appellate court to grant alimony pending an
appeal and dismissed the motion. The reasoning of the court applies not
only to an appeal of a contempt case, but also to an appeal of a divorce
or alimony decree. Although numerous courts of appeal have granted
alimony in the past, the instant case is the first one in which the consti-
tutional issue was raised.
In a separate opinion, the court passed on the merits of the contempt
conviction and set it aside on the ground that attorney's fees must be
payable to the wife and not to the attorney.13
In Denntson v. Dennzsoez'4 the Supreme Court finally settled a ques-
tion which has been the subject of conflict in the courts of appeals. The
court held that a wife has no absolute right to alimony where she is
awarded a divorce for misconduct of the husband. The decision of
whether or not to grant any alimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court. Although alimony is not mandatory, its denial may constitute an
1 Omo REv. CODE § 3105.14.
"OHIO CONS T. art. IV, § 6.
'Beach v. Beach, 130 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio App. 1955).
"1165 Ohio St. 146,134 N.E.2d 574 (1956).
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abuse of discretion. The case was remanded to determine whether such
an abuse existed.
Prior to 1951, a divorce court could do two things, and only two
things, with respect to alimony and property. It could award alimony
to the party granted the divorce or alimony only decree, either in a lump
sum or as a continuing obligation, or it could award the guilty party in
a divorce case a share of the property owned by the other spouse as a
final division of property. In numerous cases the trial courts exceeded
these limits by awarding continuing alimony to the guilty party, or di-
viding property in an alimony only action, or making a property order
which was strictly speaking neither a property division nor alimony, such
as a partition order, or an equity decree ordering one party to convey
property to the other because the property had been purchased with such
other party's funds. These decisions of the trial courts were uniformly
reversed, resulting in major restrictions on the power of the divorce court
to arrive at a just financial settlement, and in serious title complications
where realty was involved.
Today, the situation is completely changed. In 1951 the legislature
adopted two amendments to the divorce chapter. The new provisions
permit the court to award alimony or a property division to either party,
regardless of fault, and provides that in a divorce case the court retains
full equity powers.15 These statutes, coupled with the Denntson decision
discussed above, would appear to leave the court completely free to adjust
the financial relations of the parties as it deems proper.
The above comments are occasioned by three recent cases decided by
the Ohio Supreme Court. The cases are not connected except by the
fact that they all involve alimony and were decided on the same day. One
of the cases was decided under the old statute and holds that where the
divorce court did have power to transfer tide to realty to one of the par-
ties, the judgment could not be attacked in a later partition action.1 6 The
other two cases simply hold that when the legislature amended the statute
in 1951, it meant what it said. Thus, fault of the parties is no longer a
controlling factor in determining alimony,' 7 and the divorce court is now
authorized to exercise general equity powers, including a complete divi-
sion of property rights."8
3. Alimony - Modificatton and Enforcement
Two important cases on modification of alimony decrees are com-
mented upon in the next section of this artide, as the decisions involved
OHio REv. CODE 5§ 3105.18, 3105.20.
"Arbogost v. Arbogost, 165 Ohio St. 459, 136 N.E.2d 54 (1956)
"Gage v. Gage, 165 Ohio St. 462, 136 N.E.2d 56 (1956)
3' Clark v. Clark, 165 Ohio St. 457, 136, N.E.2d 52 (1956)
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modification of child support orders. However, the reasoning of the
Van Divort and Roach cases dearly applies to alimony.
Outstanding for the number and complexity of the issues raised is the
Block case. While divorce proceedings were pending, the husband con-
veyed substantially all of his property, amounting to about $1,000,000, to
an Oio trustee, under an irrevocable trust, with income reserved to him
for life and the corpus to a family foundation. The wife sued for di-
vorce in Illinois and was granted a divorce and alimony in a lump sum of
$110,000. Shortly after the divorce, the husband sued successfully in an
Ohio court to set aside the trust on the ground of undue influence on the
part of his father. The wife claimed that the whole transaction was in
bad faith and entered into in order to present a temporary appearance of
relative poverty to the Illinois divorce court. She commenced suit in the
Illinois court which granted the divorce, but made the mistake of treating
her action as a new proceeding with a new docket number. Service on
the husband, a resident of Ohio, was had by publication and mail The
husband removed the case to the federal court on diversity of citizenship
and then moved for dismissal on the ground of no personal jurisdiction.
The motion was granted and this decision was upheld by the United
States Court of Appeals. 19 In a two-to-one decision, the court held that
an action to vacate a divorce decree for fraud was a new action and not
part of the original divorce proceeding. Therefore it was properly re-
movable to a federal court, and as an in personam action required personal
service.
Mdrs. Block tried again, this time in Ohio. She presented the facts to
the common pleas court, set forth her unsuccessful attempt to persuade
the Illinois court to vacate its judgment, and asked for a decree vacating
the Illinois decree and fixing a proper financial settlement. The husband
appeared, denied any fraud on the Illinois court, and set up the defenses
of res judicata, and lack of tender back of the $110,000 which the wife
had already received. The common pleas court held that the decree of
the Illinois court was entitled to full faith and credit and could not be
modified in Ohio. The decision was affirmed by the court of appeals
without opinion. Appeal as of right was denied by the Ohio Supreme
Court on the ground that no constitutional question was involved.20 Mrs.
Block appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which was unable to
understand what the Ohio Supreme Court meant by the dismissal. The
case was remanded to the Ohio Court for decision of whether dismissal
rested on state or federal constitutional grounds.&21
"Block v. Block, 196 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1952).
=Block v. Block, 163 Ohio St. 230, 126 N.E.2d 331 (1955).
21Block v. Block, 350 U.S. 808 (1955).
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In what is probably the last word on this specific case, the Ohio Su-
preme Court refused to decide the constitutional issue of full faith and
credit, and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's petition on the ground of
lack of tender.22 The normal rule, of course, is that when a person at-
tempts to rescind a contract or judgment procured by fraud, he must
first offer to return any benefits he has received under it. The question
before the Ohio court was whether or not this rule should be applied to
an action to modify an alimony decree. The hardship inherent in re-
quiring the wife to return alimony received before modification is ap-
parent, particularly where she has spent it all for her support, and this
consideration has led the courts of New York and California to dispense
with the requirement of tender in this situation. The justification for
these decisions was the concept that a divorced wife need not tender back
because the alimony is in the nature of support which the husband is
equitably bound to furnish after divorce. This reasoning was rejected
by the Ohio court. The court did not discuss what circumstances would
excuse tender, and I think most of us would agree that if the wife could
prove that all her alimony had been spent for day-to-day living expenses,
the requirement of tender should be dispensed with.
Although all of the issues present were not passed on, there are some
lessons which can be learned from the Block case. To the lawyer who
represents a wife attempting to modify an alimony decree for fraud, I
offer the following suggestions:
(1) In your petition, offer to tender into court, or to some disin-
terested person whom the court might appoint, any benefits received un-
der the original decree. If this cannot be done, as where the wife has
spent it all, set forth in detail just why the wife cannot make a tender and
why it would be inequitable to require it.
(2) Your best chance of modification lies in the court which
granted the original decree. Denominate your pleading a motion in the
original case, with the same docket number, rather than a petition m a
new action. If personal service cannot be obtained over the defendant,
use the "continuing jurisdiction" theory discussed in the Van Dvort case,
Mnfra.23
(3) If number two is unsuccessful and you have to sue in another
state, your difficulties are great but not insuperable. Although there is no
dear cut United States Supreme Court decision on the subject, state courts
have generally assumed that direct modification of a foreign decree is
forbidden by the full faith and credit clause. However, in a number of
'Block v. Block, 165 Ohio St. 365, 135 N.E.2d 857 (1956).
'Van Divort v. Van Divort, 165 Ohio St. 141, 134 N.E. 2d 715 (1956)
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cases, state courts have indirectly modified the foreign decree obtained by
fraud by enjoining the defendant from using the decree and by relitigat-
ing the issues. Thus, in attempting to persuade an Ohio court to modify
a foreign decree for fraud, you should set forth the fraud, show that the
decree could be re-opened in the original state for fraud, set forth your
efforts to re-open in the original state and explain why you failed (as,
for example, lack of personal jurisdiction); and then ask the equity side
of the court to enjoin the husband from taking advantage of the decree
in Ohio, and ask the court to make a new alimony order.
4. Child Support and Custody Incident to a Dworce
To the attorney practicing in the domestic relations field, and faced
with the difficult problem of enforcing alimony decrees against migratory
husbands, the decision of the Supreme Court in Van Dwort v. Van
Dwort24 is easily the most important decision of the year. In this case
the wife was given custody of the child in the original divorce action and
was awarded a monthly sum for support. The husband appeared in the
Ohio court. Six years later the wife filed a petition in the same court
asking that the original decree be modified so as to increase the monthly
support payment. The husband had moved to Connecticut after the di-
vorce, and the motion was served on him by mail, pursuant to a rule of
the common pleas court The decision of the court modifying the decree
was affirmed by the court of appeals, in spite of a contrary decision by
another court of appeals. The Supreme Court heard the case because of
the conflict and upheld the decision of the trial court. The court held
that whenever a decree is subject to modification, the court keeps per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parties as long as the decree lasts. Thus the
modification is not a new proceeding but ancillary to the original divorce
action. The court also said that although the statutes provided no pro-
cedure in such a case, the statutes on notice and process are not exclusive,
and the method and sufficiency of notice to the nonresident defendant is
left to the discretion of the trial court.
There are several questions which were not settled by the decision,
but which are fairly easy of solution:
(1) The scope of the decision: Although the Van Dwort case con-
cerned an increase in child support payments, the theory of the case ap-
plies to modifications of alimony decrees, and even more important from
a practical viewpoint, to the reduction of unpaid accruals to a lump sum.
(2) The notice procedure: The Van Dwort decision involved no-
tAce by mail which was actually received. It seems dear that actual re-
29Ibid.
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ceipt is not necessary. The procedure is left to the discretion of the trial
court, limited only by the concept of due process in quasi-in-rem actions,
as set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank25 and Walker v. City of
Hfitchnson.26 Thus notice by publication alone would in most cases be
insufficient, even though authorized by the court or by statute.
(3) Recogntion of the decree in other states: This problem is of
special importance where the Van Divort procedure is used to reduce un-
paid accruals to a lump sum, which is then sought to be enforced in an-
other state. Although there is no express decision on the point, the case
of Griffin v. Griffin2 7 indicates that such a decree would be entitled to
recognition under full faith and credit. The Griffin case involved a pro-
cedure essentially similar to the Van Dwort case. The United States Su-
preme Court held that the decree was not entitled to full faith and credit,
not because there was no jurisdiction over the defendant, but because the
notice was so defective as to violate due process.
The Ohio Supreme Court finally settled a problem which has been
the subject of conflict in the lower courts. In Roach v. Roach28 the court
held that execution could not issue on individual installments of a child
support decree. The apparent hardship of requiring installments to be
reduced to a lump sum judgment, is of course, mitigated by the Van
Dwvort decision. As a policy matter, the decision appears to be correct,
although it seems to be contrary to an early decision of the same court, 9
not mentioned in the opinion. One of the most important points about
the Roach case is a reason for the decision which the court did not use.
Some of the lower courts have held that execution could not issue be-
cause unpaid accruals are subject to retroactive modification. If this is
true, the rule plays havoc with the enforcement of Ohio decrees in other
states, as such a decree is not entitled to full faith and credit.3  Fortu-
nately, the court did not rely on this reasoning in its decision.
In the Townsen case,31 the court of appeals held that where a child
becomes emancipated and self-supporting, the court would permit the
father, who paid for support pursuant to a divorce decree, to suspend
payments. This decision was rendered in spite of the fact that neither
the decree nor the underlying separation agreement permitted modification
=339 U.S. 306 (1950)
-6352 U.S. 112 (1956)
"327 U.S. 220 (1946)
'164 Ohio St. 587, 132 N.E.2d 742 (1956).
'Piatt v. Piatt, 9 Ohio 37 (1839).
1 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
mTownsen v. Townsen, 137 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio App. 1954).
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for other than specified causes. The decision seems dearly contrary to
the rule established by the Supreme Court in Tullis v. Tullis.3 2
Adoption
1. Procedure
As a general rule, the consent of the parent is necessary for adoption.
An exception exists where the parental rights have been judicially termi-
nated for cause. In Ohio there are two methods by which parental rights
can be cut off. One is found m the adoption statute which provides that
if the parent is determined guilty of "wilful neglect" the consent to adop-
tion is not required.3 3 The other stems from the juvenile statute which
provides that where the parent is guilty of "neglect" the juvenile court
can vest permanent custody in a welfare agency, and the parent loses the
right to object to adoption.34 Does the term "neglect" in the juvenile
statute refer to wilful neglect, as the adoption statute dearly does? In
the case of In re Masters,3 5 the Ohio Supreme Court answered in the af-
firmative, and held that non-wilful neglect by a parent confined to a
mental hospital was not a ground for termination in the juvenile court of
the parent's right to object to adoption.
In the Ramsey case,36 the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity for
strict compliance with the adoption statute. An adoption was success-
fully attacked by means of a habeas corpus proceeding where the juvenile
court terminated the parent's rights for cause, but failed to vest permanent
custody in a welfare agency, as required by the adoption statute.
2. Effect of Adoptton
The Ohio statute dealing with the effect of adoption says that an
adopted child is no longer the child of his natural parents for the pur-
pose of intestate succession.37 Three recent lower court decisions indicate
that the statute means just what it says, and possibly something more.
In Frantz v. Florence38 a common pleas court held that the statute not
only precluded the adopted child from inheriting from his natural parents,
but completely severed the blood line for all purposes. Thus the child
could not inherit from his natural grandfather. In the Millward case,39
1138 Ohio St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941).
Otno REV. CODE § 3107.06 (B) (4)
T OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2151.03 and 2151.27.
m165 Ohio St. 503, 137 N.E.2d 752 (1956).
'In re Ramsey, 164 Ohio St. 567, 132 N.E.2d 469 (1956).
O'Io REV. CODE § 3107.13.
S131 NX.E.2d 630 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
"'n re Estate of Milward, 136 NB.2d 649 (Ohio App. 1956).
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the court of appeals held that the adopted child could not inherit from
his natural parent who died after the statute became effective, although
the child was adopted prior to enactment of the statute. The case which
adopts the broadest construction of the statute is Campbell v. Musart So-
cmety.4° The mortmain statute states that if a testator is survived by a
lineal descendant, a bequest to charity made within a year of death is
void.4 1  In this case the bequest was made within a year, and the testator
was survived by a natural grandchild who had been adopted by the daugh-
ter-in-law of the testator and her second husband. The court construed
the mortmain statute and the adoption statute together and held that the
child was no longer a "lineal descendant" and therefore the bequest was
valid.
Paternity Actions
In Yum v. Hilton42 the defendant father was a resident of Ohio. The
child was begotten, conceived and born in New York, and both mother
and child had always been residents of New York. In an Ohio bastardy
action the defendant sought to escape liability on the ground that a pa-
ternity action was essentially a tort action and therefore the court should
apply the law of New York, which he contended relieved him of liability.
He also argued that the only state with an interest in enforcing child
support was New York, the state of domicile of the child. Both of these
contentions have been accepted in other jurisdictions, but were rejected
by the Ohio Supreme Court. The court held that the action was transi-
tory in nature and that the father can be sued under Ohio law whenever
he can be found in Ohio. The decision is certainly sound in that it tends
to avoid having this state become a refuge for fathers of illegitimate
children.
Historically, the paternity statutes were adopted to secure the main-
tenance of illegitimate children liable to become paupers in the state, and
therefore was not applied to the children of nonresident mothers. For
the same reason it is generally held that the statutory remedy is exdu-
sive and that the child has no direct action against the father for support.
In order to reach its decision, the Supreme Court said that a man has a
moral duty to support his illegitimate child and that the paternity statute
" 131 N.E.2d 279 (Ohio Prob. 1956) At the time this article went to press, news-
paper reports indicate that the probate court decision was affirmed by the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals in an unreported opinion in February 1957, and that
the case is being appealed to the Supreme Court. The three cases discussed above are
also considered in the WILLS AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES section, infra.
"OHIO REv. CODE § 2107.06.
' 165 Ohio St. 164, 134 N.E.2d 719 (1956)
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imposes a legal obligation corresponding with the moral one. This dic-
tum indicates that if the mother is unable or unwilling to bring a pater-
nity action, there is a distinct possibility that the child could sue the father
for support in an equity action, basing his right to support in Ohio on
the "legal obligation" referred to in the Yuan case.
A procedural problem of some interest was raised by the case of
State ex rel. Marshall v. Stenbaagh.43 The illegitimate child was born
in May, 1938, and a decree for monthly support until age 18 was entered
in 1939. The mother made no attempt to enforce payments until the
child was over 18. In 1956, the mother sued to -reduce the unpaid accruals
extending over the 17 year period to a lump sum judgment. The court
held that the action could be maintained and that the general ten year
statute of limitations did not begin to run against any installment until
the child became 18. The decision was based on the view that until the
child becomes 18, the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify its
decree. The decision would appear to apply to the enforcement of ali-
mony payments. The Ohio rule on limitations or laches as barring col-
lection of past alimony is not dear, and the rule applied in most juris-
dictions is that a general statute of limitations begins to run against each
installment as it becomes due.44
Husband and Wife
The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County decided an unportant case
of first impression involving the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act.45 The wife and child were abandoned in Louisiana in 1949,
and jurisdiction over the husband was obtained under the Uniform Act
in Ohio in 1955. The wife requested continuing future support for her-
self and the child and in addition requested a lump sum for reunburse-
ment for funds spent by her for support of herself and the child from
1949 to 1955. The common pleas court refused to grant reimbursement
and this decision was reversed by the court of appeals, which held that
the Act should be liberally construed in favor of the abandoned spouse
and that reimbursement was proper.46
In my opinion, the decision is correct but the reason is not. The
court looked primarily to the provisions of the Uniform Act as the basis
for decision. Specifically, the court relied on section 20 of the Act which
provides:
- 138 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio Juv. 1956).
4 4Royster v. Royster, 339 IIl. App. 250, 89 N.E.2d 279 (1949); Schumacher v.
Schumacher, 26 Wash. 2d 23, 172 P.2d 841 (1946)
43 OHio REv. CODE c. 3115.
"'Skinner v. Fasciano, 137 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio App. 1956).
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